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PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. Relationship between the process of nuclear disarmament and international peace and security

1. In recent years, the international situation has undergone tremendous changes and is now at a major turning-point. A new political world structure is being created. The discontinuation of the global ideological rivalry provides conditions for scaling down the armaments in the world. The progress recorded in the prohibition of the development, production and use of chemical as well as biological (bacteriological) weapons makes it even more compelling to register similar achievements in the field of nuclear weapons, the only means of mass destruction not yet completely banned by international agreements.

2. The conviction that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought received widespread acceptance. Hence notable progress has been made in the field of nuclear disarmament especially as a result of the disappearance of the confrontation between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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3. The maintenance and enhancement of international security require all States to contribute to arms limitation and disarmament measures as well as to show responsible behaviour in international affairs.

4. The responsible conduct of international affairs by States aimed at the maintenance of international and national security requires more than just refraining from aggression. States should demonstrate respect for international peace and security by engaging in appropriate measures of arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building and should respect their international commitments as to the agreed measures of nuclear disarmament.

5. In this new political environment it is important that the leadership of all countries assume their responsibility for seeking the objective of increased international security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. The States having the biggest nuclear arsenals can make the greatest contribution to nuclear disarmament.

6. For the achievement of such an objective, nuclear disarmament remains one of the highest priorities in the field of arms control and disarmament.

7. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as was stated at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

**B. Review and assessment of recent developments
in the process of nuclear disarmament**

8. In recent years, the situation in the field of nuclear disarmament has considerable improved, some tangible results have been achieved in the endeavour for nuclear disarmament between the United States and the former Soviet Union, as follows:

(a) The satisfactory implementation of the INF Treaty, which was accomplished in 1991 for the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons, is an important factor for increased stability and international security;

(b) Significant progress was made in 1991 in another area of nuclear disarmament, notably the START Treaty and the subsequent initiatives of both sides and the 1992 agreement on drastic reduction of a total of two thirds of strategic nuclear weapons by the year 2003;

(c) As generally recognized, the unilateral decisions by the United States and the former Soviet Union to eliminate all land-based short-range nuclear weapons constitute a further important step towards nuclear disarmament.

9. In this context, it is noted that the two nuclear Powers that are members of the European Community have also made meaningful contributions to the process of nuclear disarmament by making reductions in some of their nuclear-weapon programmes. Equally important are:

(a) The moratoriums declared by some nuclear-weapon States on nuclear testing;

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(b) The declaration and undertaking by former Soviet republics to become non-nuclear;

(c) Bilateral negotiations and their continuation enjoy universal support. At the same time the international community endorses the stated commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. Equally important are the decisions of China and France to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the adherence of South Africa as well as of other southern African States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

11. Since the elimination of nuclear weapons is a matter of priority for the entire international community, there is a need to build on current achievements and to turn them into a platform for more ambitious nuclear disarmament measures.

12. Recent initiatives in the denuclearization of Africa, in particular the accession of South Africa to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are especially welcome occurrences, including the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its fifty-fourth ordinary session held in May-June 1991.

13. The positive initiatives have taken place in Latin America, such as the Mendoza Declaration; the Cartagena Declaration; commitments entered into by Brazil and Argentina establishing full-scope safeguards regimes with IAEA; and the announcement by France of its decision to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Tlatelolco Treaty. All these occurrences are welcome and strongly supported by the international community.

II. MECHANISM FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

14. The negotiation of international agreements in conformity with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will require all forms of mechanisms for nuclear disarmament to increase their effectiveness.

15. Accordingly, bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.

16. The Conference on Disarmament as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should begin the elaboration of practical measures for nuclear disarmament. This would require streamlining the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament and improved system of reports, the establishment of the necessary subsidiary bodies in order to ensure that negotiations are held on the appropriate subjects and an adequate verification process for nuclear disarmament is created, taking account of the characteristics and complexities of the types of nuclear weapons.

17. Since it is incumbent on all States to seek ways of reducing the likelihood of scenarios of conventional confrontation escalating into the use of nuclear weapons, it seems that the international community should give serious thought to the possibility of establishing multilateral nuclear warning and crisis control centres. This would offer effective means of prevention, so as to establish conditions of predictability and stability.

18. In parallel with the global approach to nuclear disarmament, regional arrangements, namely the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, deserve serious consideration. The establishment of such nuclear-weapon-free zones as a partial measure, which is useful as a confidence-building measure, can be facilitated when the following conditions are met:

(a) Such zones are defined by the States of the region and the characteristics of the region are fully taken into account;

(b) They are based on arrangements freely arrived at between them on the basis of their own initiatives;

(c) Prior consultations are held as a necessary prerequisite among the States of the region for the establishment of such zones;

(d) The effective respect for the status of such zones by nuclear-weapon States is subject to agreed verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free of nuclear weapons.

19. Greater attention should be devoted to transparency and confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear weapons. The international community must take effective measures to ensure that all nuclear programmes are transparent. Moreover, transparency should also be achieved in the transfer of technology and material usable in the production or development of nuclear weapons.

III. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM IN THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

20. The process of nuclear disarmament was well documented in the report submitted by the Secretary-General in 1992 entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons". The Secretary-General's study notes that, since the dawn of the nuclear age almost half a century ago, efforts have been made in the world community to deal with the various implications of the existence of nuclear weapons.

21. The United Nations should continue to play the basic role in the process of disarmament negotiations with regard to both conventional and nuclear disarmament. This does not preclude the possibility that, simultaneously with this multilateral negotiation process, other processes may be developed that would be of a regional, bilateral or even a unilateral nature and would aim to bring about the destruction or reduction of various types of weapons.

22. In general, the United Nations should encourage and facilitate:

(a) The development of general guidelines and basic principles of arms control and disarmament;

(b) Consideration of ways and means of achieving the international community's objectives in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The negotiation, where appropriate, of international instruments in the field of nuclear disarmament.

23. Full use must be made of the existing mechanism, including within the United Nations system. For a considerable time, nuclear disarmament has been one of the priority topics of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The need for progress in this field requires proper attention to be paid to such issues, which deserve continued consideration in the Disarmament Commission.

24. Studies conducted by the United Nations are very useful and instrumental to the more advanced consideration of various aspects of disarmament and to the achievement of a greater general awareness of the subject. In this connection, the conclusions and recommendations on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and on nuclear weapons, as contained in documents approved by consensus, should be commended.

IV. PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, CONDITIONS AND MEASURES REQUIRED FOR STRENGTHENING THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

25. Nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to world-wide security and stability. The existence of large arsenals of nuclear weapons affects the security of all States. Thus, nuclear disarmament and the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear arms represent one of the most serious challenges, requiring continuous attention and commitment of all States Members of the United Nations. Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards System constitute the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

26. The accession of more States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was welcomed by the international community. With the accessions of China and France, all the permanent members of the Security Council will have underwritten the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus further strengthening the Treaty's universality. All States that have not yet done so are urged to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

27. In parallel with wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a better functioning of the present nuclear non-proliferation regime can be brought about. Thus, in view of recent events, a reinforcement of the various elements of that regime and, in particular, a further strengthening and improvement of safeguards implementation, as well as of nuclear export controls, are foreseeable. In this regard, it should be recalled that the European Community and its member States have already proposed a set of concrete measures to this

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end at the General Conference of IAEA. Some progress was made at the recent IAEA Board of Governors meeting towards strengthening the Agency's Safeguards System. The efforts of the Director General in this regard should be supported by all States.

28. The substantial reduction in sub-strategic nuclear weapons, as a result of unilateral initiatives, has created the basis for the complete elimination of these systems. As an intermediate objective, this would have certain advantages. It would reduce the risk of conventional war escalating into a nuclear conflict. It would lessen the risks of accidental or deliberate interference by nuclear weapons. Confining nuclear weapons to strategic systems would truly make them the weapons of last resort and so provide greater assurance that they would never be used.

29. A comprehensive ban on nuclear-testing is essential to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is now a growing recognition of the need for restraint in the development of new and more powerful nuclear weapons. There is also increasing realization that a cessation on nuclear-weapons testing would contribute to non-proliferation, as well as environmental objectives. There have been a number of significant developments in recent years in this area:

(a) The decrease in the total number of nuclear explosions and in their yield;

(b) The ratification of the protocols of the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed by United States and the Soviet Union in June 1990;

(c) The decision by the then Soviet Union to apply a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing and its extension;

(d) The decision by France to suspend its nuclear testing for 1992 and its recent extension;

(e) The decision of the United States to observe a moratorium of nuclear testing and its extension to 1995 and its commitment to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

(f) The decision of the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993 to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

30. All these unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures must be crowned by a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Undertaking reductions in the existing nuclear arsenals, without taking measures to protect future generations from another nuclear arms race, would determine the effectiveness of many of the steps taken so far. The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the highest priority measure for the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament and is the single most important measure yet to be taken in the process of nuclear disarmament. Such a measure should lead to ending qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons and new developments of weapons of mass destruction, as well as preventing their proliferation.

31. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones will assist in strengthening of security and can contribute to stability in the regions concerned, to non-proliferation and to the disarmament process in general, provided all States concerned are prepared to cooperate on the basis of freely concluded agreements and in conformity with internationally agreed principles.

32. The international community has a duty to play its part in ensuring that the destruction of nuclear weapons takes place in a safe and responsible manner, which fully respects the requirements of nuclear safety and environmental protection. Already, a number of important efforts have been made to assist in the dismantling and disposal of nuclear weapons. Consideration should be given to what further role the international community, and in particular IAEA, can play in this regard in order to expedite the realization of measures of nuclear disarmament.

33. The notion that the nuclear war must not be fought needs to be formalized in a multilateral commitment. Confidence-building measures have proved their effectiveness as a basis for more substantive measures in the field of conventional disarmament, notably in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, confidence-building measures could also serve as a useful purpose in the nuclear arms field. Such measures should aim at reassuring non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons are intended for purely defensive purposes and that nuclear arsenals are safe and under effective control.

34. In order to enhance non-proliferation, aspiring nuclear weapons States should be persuaded that their security interests could be adequately ensured by other means.

35. The only truly effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. However, for the realization of this goal it is indispensable that security assurances be given to those States that, through contractual agreements, relinquished the nuclear-weapon option; especially those among them that are not members of a strategic military alliance providing a nuclear-weapon umbrella. Unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States, welcome as they are, should be strengthened through a new Security Council resolution which, *inter alia*, could provide for a clear indication of the mandatory action to be adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and the Security Council to redress a situation where a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the object of a nuclear attack or threat of attack, the obligation to pay reparation or compensation to the victim; the obligation of States to provide immediate assistance to the victim; and the imposition of sanctions against any State, party or non-party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty (which does not place nuclear weapons on its territories). Moreover, in addition to these positive measures of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, appropriate international arrangements, preferably a binding legal instrument, should be provided to assure non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States as a measure of negative security assurance. Effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States

against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can also contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

36. For the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.
